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Abstract
I have been invited to discuss the changing role of the European Union (or “EU”) in the world
today. Let me start by highlighting some random examples of EU action in international affairs
during 1997. As Europe continues to integrate domestically, it will be forced to reassess the image
that it projects in the world. As it does so, institutional reform will become even more compelling
if the European Union is to conduct the coherent external policy that most people in the world
expect of it. Some had hoped that last the June 1997 Summit in Amsterdam would at least start
to solve these institutional questions, but the heads of state and government decided that the time
was not yet ripe for change. But it is only a matter of time before the myriad of challenges facing
the European Union and its role in the world force the issue back onto the agenda.
THE EUROPEAN UNION
IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS:
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Ambassador Hugo Paemen*
I have been invited to discuss the changing role of the Euro-
pean Union (or "EU") in the world today.
An ambassador, by definition, is not supposed to be an ex-
pert, and certainly not in constitutional systems. So, I will de-
scribe the European Union's external policy from the stand-
point of a practitioner. I am aware that this approach is not a
very glorious way to avoid a legal duel with Jacques Bourgeois,
but, this type of confrontation is not something that I would ad-
vise in any case.
At the outset, I should make a clear distinction between the
terms "European Community" (or "EC") and "European
Union." After all, until the Treaty of Amsterdam1 comes into
force, only the European Community will grant it legal personal-
ity. Therefore, please forgive me if occasionally I use the term
European Union where it is not correct. We went through a very
painful adjustment period to go from the European Community
to the European Union, so it is somewhat difficult now to make
the distinction.
Let me start by highlighting some random examples of EU
action in international affairs during 1997. In the trade sector, it
is generally recognized that the European Union played an im-
portant role in two significant World Trade Organization
("WTO") agreements. The first agreement, the Telecommuni-
cations Services Agreement, 2 was reached in February and covers
about ninety percent of world revenues in the telecommunica-
tions sector. The second agreement was the December Agree-
ment on Financial Services,3 covering about ninety-five percent
of trade in the banking, insurance, and securities sectors.
* Head of the European Commission Delegation to the United States.
1. Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties
establishing the European Communities and certain related acts, Oct. 2, 1997, O.J. C
340/1 (1997) (not yet ratified) [hereinafter Treaty of Amsterdam].
2. World Trade Organization: Agreement on Telecommunications Services, Feb.
15, 1997, 36 I.L.M. 354.
3. No publication available.
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Also in 1997, the European Union donated ECU
438,000,000 (approximately US$500,000,000) in humanitarian
aid, much of it going to the people displaced by terrible events
such as those that occurred in Rwanda. If you add to this contri-
bution the aid donated by Member States individually, the Euro-
pean Union becomes the world's top humanitarian aid donor.
An EU special envoy has been working throughout the year
to support the Middle East peace process. Also, the European
Union has adopted or renewed positions with respect to prob-
lematic states such as Cuba and Burma. Finally, it is fair to say
that the European Union led the industrialized nations in their
decision to reduce greenhouse emissions by the year 2010 at the
Kyoto Summit on Climate Change4 in December. It is true that
we did not field a team at the Nagano Olympics, but these exam-
ples leave little room for doubt that the European Union has
developed into a really significant actor in many international
spheres.
But it is not only traditional external policies that will define
and dictate the European Union's external role in the future.
As the European Community has integrated to create a single
European market and with further integration on the horizon in
the form of the Economic and Monetary Union ("EMU"), the
European Union's domestic policies are increasingly influencing
its role in the international arena.
When the idea of integrating European economies first
took root after World War II, its basic raison d'tre was to prevent
the recurrence of inter-Nicene hostilities between the European
nations by establishing irreversible links among their economies
and solidarity between their peoples. There was no thought
given to creating a new-world power. In fact, quite the contrary
was true. The economy was seen as the instrument to achieve
what was essentially a political goal of consolidating peace on the
continent.
Since 1958, the EU Founders' vision expanded geographi-
cally as the European Union enlarged successively from a mem-
bership of six to the current membership of fifteen nations, and,
with the Single European Act5 and the completion of the single
4. Conference of the Parties to the Framework Convention on Climate Change:
Kyoto Protocol, Dec. 10, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22 (1998).
5. Single European Act, O.J. L 169/1 (1987), [1987] 2 C.M.L.R. 741 [hereinafter
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market, economic integration has created a truly cohesive entity.
As early as 1973, with the first enlargement to a community of
nine, the European Community became the world's largest trad-
ing bloc. It now accounts for about twenty percent of world ex-
ports and about nineteen percent of world imports. The Euro-
pean Union's gross domestic product ("GDP") has risen to some
US$8.6 trillion, compared to about US$7.2 trillion for the
United States and US$5 trillion for Japan. This rise in GDP has
evidently had its own implications for the importance and scope
of EU external relations.
The original Treaty of Rome 6 contained three major provi-
sions in the area of external relations. First, a special regime for
development aid and cooperation was established,7 initially aid-
ing developing countries that had a long-standing relationship,
mostly of a colonial nature, with founding Member States. This
regime was then developed and extended through the so-called
YaoundP8 and Lom 9 Conventions, until today, when seventy de-
veloping countries are linked to the European Union in this way.
Over ninety-nine percent of their imports enjoy free access to
the European Union without offsetting concessions.
A substantial review is now underway to look at future op-
tions for the relationship when the present agreement expires in
two years time. In parallel, the European Union's developmen-
tal activities have grown to include virtually all of the developing
world, with an expanding variety of instruments and total annual
spending commitments of around ECU4 billion.
Second, the Treaty of Rome provided for the conclusion of
so-called "association agreements. "10 The first association agree-
SEA] (amending Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25,
1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter EEC Treaty]).
6. EEC Treaty, supra note 5.
7. Id. arts. 131-36, at 65-67.
8. The Yaound6 Conventions link the European Community to African states, pro-
viding, among other things, financial and technical assistance for economic develop-
ment. Convention of Association Between the European Economic Community and
Associated African States, Jul. 20, 1963, 2 I.L.M. 971; Convention of Association Be-
tween the European Economic Community and Associated African States, Jul. 29, 1969,
9 I.L.M. 484 (1970).
9. European Economic Community-African, Caribbean, and Pacific Countries
Convention ("ACP-EEC Convention"), Feb. 28, 1975, 14 I.L.M. 596; Second ACP-EEC
Convention, Oct. 31, 1979, 19 I.L.M. 327; Third ACP-EEC Convention, Dec. 8, 1984, 24
I.L.M. 571 (1985); Fourth ACP-EEC Convention, Dec. 1, 1989, 29 I.L.M. 783 (1990).
10. EEC Treaty, supra note 5, art. 238, at 92.
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ments were concluded with countries in the Mediterranean, es-
sentially on grounds of domestic security, starting with Greece
and Turkey. Since then, agreements with different degrees of
commitment and different economic and political purposes
have been concluded with almost every country, except some of
the most-developed countries such as the United States, Japan,
and Australia.
Association agreements entail the closest relationship with
the European Union and, while they usually involve some form
of reciprocal obligation, tariff-free entry of most manufactured
products into the European Union lies at their heart. Agree-
ments with countries of the European Economic Area,11 the
Mediterranean, and the so-called Europe Agreements 12 with
Central and Eastern European countries all fall into this bracket,
although these agreements differ one from another in their pur-
pose and scope.
By contrast, non-preferential trade and cooperation agree-
ments, the type the European Union has negotiated with many
countries of Southeast Asia and Latin America, tend to provide a
first step towards closer relationships that will solidify over time.
These agreements are usually aimed at lesser-developed coun-
tries and typically include cooperation instruments to provide in-
frastructure assistance. Between these two types of agreements,
the European Union has developed a hybrid of "partnership
agreements" sharing features of cooperation accords and Eu-
rope Agreements to manage its relations. with the successor
states of the former Soviet Union. What is striking about all
these agreements is the extent to which, although based on com-
mercial goals, they also function to fulfill political considera-
tions.
Third, and finally, once the Founders chose the option of a
customs union as the vehicle for their vision, which entailed a
unified border regime, a common trade policy vis-A-vis the rest of
11. Agreement on the European Economic Area, O.J. L 1/1 (1994).
12. The Europe Agreements are a series of association agreements into which the
European Community entered with various Central European countries pursuant to
the authority granted in Article 238 of the Treaty establishing the European Commu-
nity. Roger J. Goebel, The European Community and Eastern Europe: "Deepening" and
"Widening" the Community Brand of Economic Federalism, 1 NEW EUR. L. REv. 163, 218-23
(1993).
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the world was inevitable. By default, the European Community
became an actor in world trade.
The Treaty of Rome set out the basis for the common com-
mercial policy.1 3 From the beginning, the European Commu-
nity has retained exclusive competence for this policy, with the
European Commission ("Commission") acting on behalf of the
European Community on the basis of a qualified majority from
the Council. The European Community, although not itself a
contracting party, participated from the start in the multilateral
trade negotiations organized in the framework of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT"),14 and has been a de
facto member of GATT since the early 1970s. The European
Union is also, together with the Member States, a Founding
Member of the WTO.
The scope of negotiations and the work of GATT has been
substantially extended over the years to keep pace with the
forces of globalization and as attention has shifted from tradi-
tional trade barriers. Now, in addition to tariff rules, there are
WTO rules on the whole repertory of non-tariff barriers, intellec-
tual property, investment measures, and services, as well as dis-
cussions on the interaction between trade and other policies
such as environment and competition.
Indeed, it was perhaps during the concluding phases of the
Uruguay Round15 that the full stature of the European Union in
global trade affairs was displayed for the first time as the world
spotlight fell on the European Union and the United States
hammering out the final deal. Ironically, it was at that moment
that an internal debate arose between EU Member States and
the Commission about the coverage of the existing commercial
policy provisions-the famous Article 113 16-as it related to the
areas of intellectual property and services. During the course of
the debate, the Commission negotiated agreements covering
both of these areas, using standard European Economic Com-
13. EEC Treaty, supra note 5, arts. 113-16, at 60-61.
14. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3, T.I.A.S.
No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187.
15. Id.
16. Treaty establishing the European Community, Feb. 7, 1992, OJ. C 224/1, at 44
(1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 573, 656 [hereinafter EC Treaty], incorporating changes made
by Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7,1992, O.J. C 224/1 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 719
[hereinafter TEU]. The Treaty on European Union ("TEU") amended the EEC
Treaty, supra note 5, as amended by SEA, supra note 5.
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munity commercial policy procedures. Nevertheless, when the
European Court of Justice was consulted, it stated in Opinion 1/
94 that only certain aspects of the two sectors could be consid-
ered as falling under Article 113, and thereby under the Euro-
pean Community's competence.17 Consequently, the rest had to
be treated as falling under the external competence of Member
States.
During the Intergovernmental Conference that produced
the Treaty of Amsterdam, the Commission, reacting against
Opinion 1/94, made a proposal to enlarge the scope of the rele-
vant treaty provisions to include explicitly services and intellec-
tual property. But, Member States balked at the idea. It is unde-
niable that Opinion 1/94 represents a step backwards in what
had been, up until then, the successful development of EC com-
mercial policy. This digression is something on which I imagine
Jacques Bourgeois will comment further.
Although the Treaty of Amsterdam has made some amend-
ments making it clear that Article 113 procedures can extend to
the full range of intellectual property and services, it still repre-
sents a high hurdle in that decisions relating to these sectors
must initially be unanimous. 8 In contrast, other fields covered
by Article 113 are only subject to decision by a qualified majority.
Given the relatively strong growth expected in future services
trade, as well as in trade related to intellectual property, this de-
velopment will inevitably shrink the de facto scope of the com-
mercial policy. Even with the provisions of the Amsterdam
Treaty, enabling the Commission to act as spokesperson in this
type of negotiation,"° it will be much harder to reach a commu-
nity position if Member States are forced to reach a consensus.
Already, this unanimity requirement is being used against
17. Opinion 1/94, [1994] E.C.R. 1-5267, 1-5401, [1995] 1 C.M.L.R. 205, 316.
18. Treaty of Amsterdam, supra note 1, art. 2(20), O.J. C 340/1, at 35 (1997) (in-
serting art. 113(5) into EC Treaty); Consolidated version of the Treaty establishing the
European Community, art. 133(5), O.J. C 340/3, at 238 (1997), 37 I.L.M. 79, 108 (not
yet ratified) [hereinafter Consolidated EC Treaty] (art. 113(5) of EC Treaty), incorporat-
ing changes made by Treaty of Amsterdam, supra. By virtue of the Treaty of Amsterdam,
articles of the EC Treaty will be renumbered in the Consolidated version of the Treaty
establishing the European Community. Treaty of Amsterdam, supra, art. 12, OJ. C
340/1, at 78-79 (1997).
19. Treaty of Amsterdam, supra note 1, art. 2(20), OJ. C 340/1, at 35 (1997) (in-
serting art. 113(5) into EC Treaty); Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 18, art. 133(5),
OJ. C 340/3, at 238 (1997), 37 I.L.M. at 108 (art. 113(5) of EC Treaty).
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us. Despite the fact that the European Union is the guarantor
for implementing the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights20 ("TRIPs") throughout the Euro-
pean Community, some WTO members have introduced cases
related to these sectors against individual Member States instead
of against the European Union as a whole. For example, the
United States has brought various TRIPs cases against Member
States, including Ireland, Sweden, and Denmark.2 1 This setback
shows a clear reluctance on the part of Member States to extend
the scope of the European Community's competence in a way
that takes account of services and intellectual property issues
currently forming an integral and important part of trade policy
and international trade.
The main argument of the Commission in the discussions
was based on the need for the European Union to be effective in
international negotiations. But the Member States were not
ready to be convinced, perhaps because the very success of the
Uruguay Round sparked concerns about the balance between
the respective roles of the European Community and Member
States in international affairs, a reaction reminiscent of the de-
bate over the Common Foreign and Security Policy ("CFSP").22
The proposals to work out a common foreign and security
policy beg the question of whether this setback in the European
Union's ability to act efficiently and coherently in trade matters
has been compensated by additional external competencies else-
where. Indeed, at a very early stage in European unification,
political leaders in Europe became aware, insofar as they had
not been convinced from the beginning, of the inevitable polit-
ical dimension of economic integration, particularly of its im-
pact on the rest of the world.
At what was still at that time called the European Summit, in
the Hague in December 1969, the heads of state and govern-
ment of the six Member States asked their ministers of foreign
affairs to study how progress could best be made in the area of
20. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC,
LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-REsULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994).
21. For instance, the United States brought a case against Ireland regarding meas-
ures affecting the grant of copyrights and neighboring rights.
22. TEU, supra note 16, tit. V, Oj. C 224/1, at 94-96 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at
729-34.
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political unification. Their report, which not surprisingly pro-
posed cooperation in the area of foreign policy, became the ba-
sis of what would for the next twenty-five years be called Euro-
pean Political Cooperation ("EPC").23 The procedure was
purely intergovernmental and based on unanimity, a procedural
constraint reflecting a strong belief that foreign policy decisions
remained under the sovereign competence of national govern-
ments.
In the beginning, cooperation at ministerial as well as at of-
ficial levels was totally separate from the discussions and the de-
cision-making in the context of the European Communities. In
addition, the Commission was rarely consulted. Soon, of course,
this artificial separation had to be abandoned. The Commission
became a regular participant, and in rare cases where foreign
policy decisions required implementation, for instance, in cases
of economic sanctions, this decision-making had to be done in a
community context.
Although the Single European Act in 1987 established a
legal base for EPC, in other respects it remained largely un-
changed and largely intergovernmental. It was only when faced
with the challenge both by upheavals in Central and Eastern Eu-
rope, and later the European response to the Iraqi crisis in 1990
and 1991, that thoughts turned once more to extending cooper-
ation in foreign policy. The result, among the common objec-
tives of the Maastricht Treaty, was "the implementation of a com-
mon foreign and security policy including the eventual framing
of a common defence policy .. "24 To the extent that Title V
brought foreign policy under the umbrella of the European
Union, it represents a step forward in clarity and intent. And, by
bringing the Council to the heart of the structure, it has stream-
lined procedures and removed some of the contortions of EPC.
There are also more transparent instruments. Member
States have to conform to common positions of the Council and,
through joint actions, are committed to acting in support of
these common positions. Finally, provisions of the Amsterdam
Treaty give CFSP a clearer character by creating a high represen-
23. For a description and analysis of such foreign policy coordination, see EURO-
PEAN POLITICAL COOPERATION IN THE 1980s: A COMMON FOREIGN POLICY FOR WESTERN
EUROPE? (Alfred Pijpers et al. eds., 1988).
24. TEU, supra note 16, tit. I, art. B, O.J. C 224/1, at 5 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at
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tative of EU foreign policy,25 assisted by a new policy planning
and early warning unit in the Secretariat of the Council.26
But, for all these developments, CFSP is dogged by the leg-
acy of EPC. Decision-making procedures remain cumbersome.
The European Council defines the strategies, principles, and
general guidelines within which the Council makes decisions
and, crucially,, those decisions are still taken unanimously with
the result that even the most innocuous resolution can poten-
tially be held to ransom.
The Amsterdam Treaty has brought limited majority voting
for implementing foreign policy once it has been agreed in out-
line by unanimity.27 But European leaders retain an internal di-
chotomy-schizophrenia is probably a better word-that they
consider a common foreign policy to be desirable in general
terms, but cannot bring themselves to achieve it if it means hav-
ing to forgo their own national external policies.
Not surprisingly, CFSP and the striving for political union in
that respect have not produced any spectacular results to date.
A new title and revised procedures are no substitute for political
will and cannot make Member States any more likely to agree on
appropriate action in a given situation than they have in the
past. In fact, many of the European Union's concrete achieve-
ments in foreign policy terms have come through the European
Community's existing external powers.
Even where a foreign policy position has been reached, its
definition and implementation have been largely helped for-
ward by the existence of EC instruments, particularly those of a
budgetary nature. For example, EC instruments advanced EC
external policy with respect to the Mediterranean and the New
25. Treaty of Amsterdam, supra note 1, art. 1(10), OJ. C 340/1, at 13 (1997) (re-
placing J.8(3) of TEU); Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union, art.
18(3), OJ. C 340/2, at 159 (1997), 37 I.L.M. 67, 72 (not yet ratified) [hereinafter Con-
solidated TEU] (art. J.8 (3) of TEU), incorporating changes made by Treaty of Amsterdam,
supra. By virtue of the Treaty of Amsterdam, articles of the TEU will be renumbered in
the Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union. Treaty of Amsterdam,
supra, art. 12, O.J. C 340/1, at 78-79 (1997).
26. Treaty of Amsterdam, supra note 1, Declaration on the establishment of a pol-
icy planning and early warning unit, OJ. C 340/1, at 132 (1997).
27. Treaty of Amsterdam, supra note 1, art. 1(10), OJ. C 340/1, at 14-15 (1997)
(replacingJ.13(2) of TEU); Consolidated TEU, supra note 25, art. 23, O.J. C 340/2, at
160-61 (1997), 37 I.L.M. at 72-73 (art. J.13(2) of TEU).
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Transatlantic Agenda28 between the European Union and the
United States, as well as enhanced cooperation with Asia
through the ASEAN Initiative, 29 all of which were built on long-
standing relations forged through external economic ties. A
similar economic basis supports the European Union's contribu-
tion to the peace processes in the Middle East and former Yugo-
slavia. Moreover, the European Union's quintessentially polit-
ical relations with Central and Eastern Europe have been fo-
cused through Europe Agreements negotiated under the
European Community's competence.
Action has rarely been taken under CFSP. The areas in
which it has proven most successful, usually involving money, are
those where its procedures have been most communautaire. In
1995, the European Union gave Russia US$1.5 billion to assist its
transition to democracy. In 1996, European humanitarian aid
was almost US$2 billion, one-third more than the United States.
But, because Member States have proved reluctant to contribute
to CFSP action from national budgets, EC financing has become
the norm, leading inevitably to indirect communitization of
CFSP as the Commission presents the budget and the European
Parliament decides in relation to non-obligatory expenditure.
Returning to my earlier question, in theory, CFSP has cer-
tainly added to the competence of the European Union to act in
external matters. In practice, without the political will necessary
to adapt the decision-making machinery or to use it effectively,
CFSP has done more to raise, and then to disappoint, expecta-
tions than it has to enhance the European Union's international
role. That said, the Treaty of Amsterdam did make another
change, which may in the long run have a profound effect on
the European Union's international standing. Bringing in a
large part of cooperation in justice and home affairs, including
border control, visa policy, and asylum procedures, 30 will make
the European Community a more viable interlocutor in issues
28. The New Transatlantic Agenda, vol. 6, no. 49 U.S. Department of State Dis-
patch, 894-96, Dec. 4, 1995.
29. Association of Southeast Asian Nations Declaration, Aug. 8, 1967, 6 I.L.M.
1233.
30. Treaty of Amsterdam, supra note 1, art. 2(15), OJ. C 340/1, at 28-32 (1997)
(inserting tit. lila into EC Treaty); Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 18, tit. IV, O.J. C
340/3, at 200-05 (1997), 37 I.L.M. at 89-91 (tit. lia of EC Treaty). Title IIla comprises
the substantive areas that have been transferred from the former cooperation injustice
and home affairs to the European Union's competence.
S145
8146 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 22:S136
such as crime and drugs, which preoccupy allies such as the
United States.
So far I have concentrated on the European Union's role in
external affairs as it derives from its external policies. As I said
before, there are other areas where internal policies have or are
likely to spill over and impact the international arena. One ex-
ample is that of competition policy, an area in which the Com-
mission has been active since the early 1960s. Competition rules
have always been regarded in Europe as a necessary complement
to the creation of a single market. They were designed to ensure
that the benefits of tearing down regulatory barriers would not
be undermined by the anti-competitive behavior of the private
sector. The enforcement of such rules was also directed at for-
eign companies that had a commercial presence in the Euro-
pean Union or who were otherwise affecting market conditions
in Europe by their behavior.
With increasing worldwide economic interdependency and
the emergence of global markets for a large number of prod-
ucts, more and more competition cases concern operations that
take place outside of the European Union. The most striking
example was last year's merger between Boeing and McDonnell
Douglas. As you know, competition authorities on both sides of
the Atlantic examined the operation and came to different con-
clusions, the Commission being more stringent in its approach.
Fortunately, we managed to avert a major controversy because
Boeing agreed to certain conditions in implementing the deal.
But this case shows that even in carrying out policies that have
traditionally been domestic, we are increasingly influencing eco-
nomic conditions in other parts of the world. In addition, the
Boeing/McDonnell Douglas example underlines the need for
international rules and mechanisms to address cross-border
competition problems.
Nowhere is the external effect of domestic policies likely to
be as potent as the EMU, currently on track to enter into force at
the beginning of next year. This issue is essentially a domestic
one, the next natural step of European internal integration. But
we can expect it to give a major boost to future EU negotiators in
their contacts with the rest of the world, a fact as true for busi-
ness as it is for governments.
First and foremost, we expect that the Euro will be benefi-
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cial for international trade. The criteria for prudent economic
management required in order to prepare for the EMU are the
recipe for low interest rates, strong investment growth, and
therefore high growth and job creation. Given that the Euro-
pean Union's GDP is larger than either the United States' or
Japan's, we can also expect that the Euro, over time, will play an
increasingly important role in international trade. The Euro's
importance will probably surface first in countries that have
close economic and trade relations with the European Union,
but gradually throughout the rest of the world. The increasing
use of the Euro does not mean, of course, that the dollar will not
continue to play a very important role. Likewise, given the cur-
rent dominance of the dollar in international capital markets,
there is some scope for an increasing presence for the Euro, and
we expect corresponding movements in its role as a reserve cur-
rency and in exchange markets.
Although the procedures relating to official international
representation in monetary and financial matters have not yet
been worked out, there is no doubt that participants represent-
ing a currency area the size of the Euro will have a strong voice
in international economic discussions. It is up to Europeans to
organize themselves in an appropriate and effective way. But, in
light of what I said earlier, one can hope that the results will be
more impressive than CFSP.
All in all, the European Union has, at least potentially, a
broad spectrum of competence to conduct external relations
and a correspondingly wide array of policies. Not surprisingly, it
is most effective and is taken most seriously as an actor on the
world stage in those areas where it has exclusive competence,
and, inversely, it appears to be weakest where its competence to
act is weakest.
Increasingly, the European Union's size and growth will
project its domestic policies into the international arena. Al-
ready we are seeing the effects not only of competition policy,
but also of other policies that are designed to protect public in-
terests, such as privacy, environmental protection, health and
safety, animal health, and so on. EMU, the next logical step in
domestic integration, is likely to have a major impact not only on
international markets, but also on the weight attributed to the
European Union as an international actor.
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All of these things will, of course, go hand in hand with in-
creased responsibilities of the European Union, and one can
only hope that Member States and EC institutions will find a
workable and convincing answer to these new challenges. It still
remains true, however, that what the European Union can show
in terms of international clout today is largely based on its
weight as a trading partner to the rest of the world. It is in this
area more than any other that the European Union has been in
a position to argue, negotiate, and deliver as an equal partner to
its major competitors. Its increasing role and stature in other
sectors, foreign policy, monetary policy, the environment, devel-
opmental aid, and so on, still relies today to a large extent on its
attractiveness and strength as a trading power.
But change is just over the horizon. As Europe continues to
integrate domestically, it will be forced to reassess the image that
it projects in the world. As it does so, institutional reform will
become even more compelling if the European Union is to con-
duct the coherent external policy that most people in the world
expect of it. Some had hoped that last the June 1997 Summit in
Amsterdam would at least start to solve these institutional ques-
tions, but the heads of state and government decided that the
time was not yet ripe for change. But it is only a matter of time
before the myriad of challenges facing the European Union and
its role in the world force the issue back onto the agenda.
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